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INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND THE 
RESOLUTION OF A COMMONS DILEMMA 
This is the story of the fight to supply water for 250,000 people 
living in 82,000 homes in West Basin. It tells of efforts to find 
water for industries located here, so that thousands of workers 
might draw daily wages .... Tangible property, with an assessed 
value of over 250 million, had been developed and established, 
based on a water supply that was believed to be abundant and 
constant. 
This is the story of depletion and contamination of that water 
supply. It is the story of reports, studies, investigations, 
committee meetings, mass meetings, parades, and elections, and 
also a story of opposing views, of tempers and temperament, of 
nonsensical argument. Finally, it is a story of success, of 
community cooperation, of mutual helpfulness, and of buried 
antagonisms. (Fossette, 1950, p. i )  
West Basin i s  a n  underground water bas in located adjacent t o  the 
Pacific Coast in Los Arigeles County,  Cali fornia. It i s  the  last of several 
interconnected groundwater  basins under ly ing  the south coastal plain. 
The success o f  the  Nest Basin water producers in overcoming problems of 
deplet ion and contamination o f  the water resource makes t h i s  case re levant  
for those in terested b o t h  in water resource management strategies and in 
more genera l  questions concerning the  resolut ion o f  commons problems. 
As an example of a solut ion t o  a commons dilemma situation, n o t  on ly  
are the  ins t i tu t iona l  arrangements used in West Basin re levant  t o  a b road 
class o f  problems but proposit ions der ived  f rom the  theory o f  commons 
dilemma situations can be  examined f o r  t h e i r  empirical relevance in th is  
na tura l  set t ing.  Commons dilemmas arise from the  jo in t  use of a common- 
pool resource. A common-pool resource prov ides a f in i te  flow o f  separable 
"use-units" o v e r  time. Mul t ip le  ind iv iduals  can use a common-pool re-  
source system simultaneously, but each person 's  consumption subtracts  the  
amount consumed from the  q u a n t i t y  available t o  others. '  
Not every  common-pool resource wi l l  necessari ly produce a commons 
dilemma. A commons dilemma is  characterized by the overuse, erosion, 
and deter iorat ion o f  the  resource's ab i l i t y  t o  cont inue t o  p rov ide  the 
valued "use-units." Whether o r  n o t  a commons dilemma arises in a par t ic -  
u l a r  case o f  a common-pool resource depends upon the  behavior o r  users, 
which in turn depends upon the  s t r u c t u r e  of the i r  si tuation and the  incen- 
t i ves  they  face. 
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Foundation, NSF SES 83-09829. Views expressed are the  authors;  a n d  n o t  
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A l t h o u g h  t h e  theo ry  o f  commons dilemma situations i s  incomplete, sever- 
al scholars have developed dynamic models tha t  p r e d i c t  stable, long-term 
cooperative solut ions (Lewis 6 Cowens, 1983) o r  t he  poss ib i l i ty  o f  long- 
te rm cooperative equ i l i b r i a  (Axe l rod ,  1981; Tay lo r ,  1977; Hard in ,  1982). 
O the rs  have  presumed t h e  pr inc ipa l - -perhaps the  only--hope f o r  resolut ion 
o f  t he  cornmons dilemma a n d  the  p rese rva t i on  o f  t he  common resource is t h e  
coerc ive i n te rven t ion  o f  an  ex te rna l  regu la to r  ( C a r r u t h e r s  & Stoner, 1981 ) .  
S t i l l  o the rs  have concerned themselves w i t h  the  poss ib i l i t ies  for " p r i v a t -  
iz ing"  t h e  commons by establ ish ing separable and  t ransferable p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  t o  t h e  commons (Sinn,  1984; Welch, 1983; Anderson & Hi l l ,  1977). 
T h e  West Basin case i s  no tewor thy  because t h e  actions taken t o  p re -  
serve the  commons were p r i m a r i l y  designed by the  water  p roducers  them- 
selves, r a t h e r  than  being imposed on  them by a state o r  national goverr i -  
ment. Ye t  in West Basin, s t r i c t l y  p r i v a t e  act ion was n o t  t he  case e i ther .  
Publ ic  i ns t i t u t i ons  and  of f ic ia ls  were i nvo l ved  th roughou t  the  process of 
resolut ion.  T h e  a b i l i t y  t o  use, create, and  a l te r  pub l i c  i ns t i t u t i ons  was 
c r i t i ca l  t o  t h e  formulation and  implementation o f  t he  actions agreed upon  by 
the  local p roducers .  Thus,  resolut ion t o  t h i s  case by a m i x t u r e  o f  p r i v a t e  
a n d  p u b l i c  i ns t i t u t i ona l  ar rangements const i tu tes a promis ing "middle 
g r o u n d "  fo r  t h e  resolut ion o f  commons problems. 
In t h i s  paper  we consider  the  process o f  resolut ion o f  a commons dilem- 
ma in dynamic s i tuat ions i nvo l v ing  commons-sharing arrangements w i thou t  
an  ex te rna l l y  imposed solut ion, and  we g i v e  pa r t i cu la r  a t tent ion t o  a model 
presented by Lewis a n d  Cowens (1982) and  t o  t h e  condi t ions necessary t o  
t h e i r  r e s u l t  o f  a cooperative p r i v a t e  arrangement, p r i v a t e l y  enforced. A 
d i f f e r e n t  set pe rm i t s  a v a r i e t y  o f  processes t o  resolve a commons dilemma, 
one of wh ich  is i l l us t ra ted  in West Basin. Th roughou t  t h i s  presentation, it 
is o u r  pu rpose  t o  build upon  and  con t r i bu te  t o  the  w o r k  o f  those scholars 
who have sough t  means o the r  than  an  external ly-coerced solut ion t o  such 
f requen t ,  d i f f i c u l t ,  and  var iegated problems. 
Condi t ions for t h e  Resolut ion o f  a Commons Dilemma 
A t  ieast two ways e x i s t  f o r  resolv ing a commons dilemma in the  absence 
o f  an  ex te rna l l y  imposea resolut ion. One way,  wh ich  has a l ready been 
explored in the  l i t e ra tu re ,  invo lves n o t  on l y  the  absence o f  a coercive 
ex te rna l  regu la to r  but the  absence of any pub l i c  i ns t i t u t i ons  whatever .  
T h i s  approach re l ies en t i re l y  o n  v o l u n t a r y ,  independerit  decisions made by 
t h e  pa r t i c i pan ts .  Ano the r  way, wh ich  we propose, allows pub l i c  i ns t i -  
t u t i ons  t o  fac i l i ta te  v o l u n t a r y  agreements. 
Resolut ion Without I ns t i t u t i ons  
T h e  prLvate " resolut ion w i thou t  inst i tu t ionsI i  approach is presented in 
a n  impor tant  dynamic model by Lewis and  Cowens (1983). They  model the 
j o in t  use o f  an  ocean f i she ry  by a g r o u p  who ha rves t  f i s h  in each time 
per iod.  Lewis and  Cowens at tempt  t o  account fo r  cooperative behavior  in 
a conimons dilemma in the  absence o f  an imposed so lut ion o r  external  
regulat ion.  T h e y  search f o r  condi t ions u n d e r  wh ich  "users may b e  able t o  
c o n s t r u c t  a cooperative scheme fo r  conserv ing the  resource tha t  is self- 
pol icing," w i t h  enforcement by " the  th rea t  o f  re ta l ia t ion by others"  (1983, 
p. 2 ) .  T h e i r  conclusion i s  fundamental ly d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  de r i ved  f rom 
stat ic  models. Lewis and  Cowens p r e d i c t  an i nde f in i t e l y  extended coopera- 
t i v e  equ i l i b r i um in the j o in t  use o f  an  open-access f i she ry .  All par t i c -  
ipants  monitor t he  behavior  o f  r i va l s  and  ha rves t  a t  an  ef f ic ient  ra te  ( f o r  
t h e  commons) as long as each observes the o the rs  do ing so. 
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In l i g h t  o f  t h e i r  opt imis t ic  predic t ions fo r  t he  resolut ion o f  t he  commons 
dilemma, and  g i v e n  t h e i r  pu rpose  in d e r i v i n g  such a resolut ion w i thou t  t he  
involvement o f  i ns t i t u t i ons ,  it i s  impor tant  t o  examine in some deta i l  t h e  
assumptions u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  Lewis and  Cowens's model. Lewis and  Cow- 
ens's outcome res ts  upon  f i v e  necessary condit ions. Each o f  t he  f i v e  
condit ions-- information, communication, synimetry , enforcement, and  moni- 
toring--has been widely  discussed by scholars concerned w i t h  the  resolu- 
t ion o f  commons dilemma situations. For  scholars in terested in unders tand -  
ing how ind i v idua ls  cope w i t h  cont inu ing,  long-term commons dilemmas, t h e  
pa r t i cu la r  assumptions made about  each of  these condi t ions by Lewis and  
Cowens a re  h a r d  to  accept. T h e i r  assumptions are logical f ic t ions neces- 
sary t o  d r i v e  t h r o u g h  a proof .  One might  simply re ject  them a l l  as un- 
real ist ic. 
We view each o f  these f i v e  condi t ions as variables t h a t  may take on 
values prog ress i ve l y  approx imat ing t h e  condi t ions p resen t  in Lewis and  
Cowens's model. We then  asked what  t y p e  o f  i ns t i t u t i ona l  arrangements 
might  enhance t h e  poss ib i l i ty  t ha t  t h i s  var iab le would approach a h i g h  
value in the  same d i rec t i on  as t h e  assumption made by Lewis and  Cowens. 
Gur  focus i s  on  t h e  quest ion:  Under  what  inst i tu t ional  arrangements would 
the  va lue o f  t h i s  var iab le tend  to  approach t h a t  pos i ted by Lewis and  
Cowens. 
The  In format ion Condit ion. Lewis a n d  Cowens presume, as do  most 
formal theor is ts ,  t h a t  pa r t i c i pan ts  have complete in format ion about  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  s i tuat ion they  face. Par t ic ipants  a r e  presumed to  have 
in format ion concern ing the  resource they  a re  us ing  and  t h e i r  own and  
o the rs '  use. T h e y  know the  capacity and  g r o w t h  ra te  o f  t he  common 
resource, and  t h u s  a r e  able t o  take f u t u r e  deplet ion ef fects  i n t o  account in 
assessing t h e  p resen t  va lue o f  cooperative and  noncooperative strategies. 
Par t ic ipants  know t h e  safe y i e l d  o f  t he  resource, t h e  to ta l  amount of f i sh  
ha rves ted  by use rs  in each time per iod,  and  make comparisons between the  
two. Therefore,  t hey  know i f  even a single user  increases h i s  o r  he r  
ha rves t .  Par t ic ipants  also know the  total number o f  users,  and  t h e  
amount by wh ich  o the r  use rs  would it icrease t h e i r  ha rves t  if a l l  defect. 
Thus,  t h e y  can calculate t h e  deplet ion ef fects  o f  j o in t  noncooperation. 
Complete in format ion i s  necessary i n  a model t h a t  excludes the  consid- 
erat ion o f  i ns t i t u t i ons .  In the  absence o f  an information source,  one must 
presume t h a t  pa r t i c i pan ts  a l ready hold a l l  knowledge necessary to  t h e i r  
calculat ions, learn ing i s  n o t  needed. Assuming complete information in a 
dynamic model places pa r t i c i pan ts  in a post - learn ing mode. They  beg in  
t h e i r  pa r t i c i pa t i on  in t h e  use o f  t h e  commons a l ready comprehending a l l  
t h a t  i s  impor tant  t o  t h e i r  decisionmaking. 
T h e  Communication Condit ion. Lewis and  Cowens abs t rac t  from problems 
o f  communication among use rs  by assuming t h a t  communication i s  immediate, 
und is to r ted ,  a n d  costless. In format ion i s  shared by a l l  because it i s  he ld 
by each. Th rea ts  o f  re ta l ia t ion a re  understood by a l l  because a l l  use rs  
are assumed to  b e  identical,  facing identical s t ra teg ic  s i tuat ions resu l t i ng  
from ident ica l  amounts o f  use. T h i s  in teract ion o f  t he  information condi- 
t i on  d iscussed above w i t h  the symmetry condi t ion discussed below renders  
communication among use rs  unnecessary, wh ich  i s  t he  same as assuming 
pe r fec t  and  costless communication. Lewis and  Cowens note t h i s  in t h e i r  
discussion o f  t h e  e f fec t  o f  the number o t  ha rves te rs  by acknowledging tha t  
an increase in the  number o f  pa r t i c i pan ts  is usual ly  associated w i t h  in- 
creased negotiat ion and  moni tor ing costs (1983,  p. 1 5 ) .  
Blomquist & Ostrom: Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma 
We have taken a d i f f e r e n t  approach. 
T h e  Symmetry Condit ion. Lewis and  Cowens assume t h a t  a l l  use rs  are 
ident ica l  a n d  the re  i s  pe r fec t  symmetry in use and  in benef i ts  from use. 
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The  r e s u l t ,  an i nde f in i t e l y  extended cooperative equi l ibr ium,  i s  conait ioned 
on the  assumption tha t  each use r  consumes l l n th  o f  the p resen t  y ie ld  o f  
t he  resource, each u s e r  maximizes the  same utility funct ion,  and  each use r  
ha rves ts  the  same amount f rom t h e  resource a n d  de r i ves  t h e  same utility 
from t h a t  ha rves t .  T h i s  condi t ion ( 1 )  allows pa r t i c i pan ts  t o  take  one 
ano the r ' s  act ions i n to  account and  recognize what  w i l l  succeed in d e t e r r i n g  
defect ions and  ( 2 )  removes f rom t h e  analysis potent ia l ly  t h o r n y  problems o f  
" fa i rness1 '  t h a t  may ar ise in the  development o f  a resolut ion o f  a commons 
dilemma t h a t  invo lves unequal  d i v i s ion  o f  t he  commons. T h i s  symmetry 
condi t ion d r i v e s  the  model's p r i v a t e  enforcement mechanism a long way: t h e  
shared unders tand ing  o f  pa r t i c i pan ts  t h a t  all wi l l  cooperate o r  all wi l l  
defect  is premised on  t h e  condi t ion t h a t  a l l  a r e  a l i ke  in use o f  t h e  commons 
and  bene f i t s  d e r i v e d  theref rom. 
T h e  Enforcement Condit ion--Deterrence. Lewis and  Cowens's ha rves te rs  
enforce t h e i r  commons-sharing arrangement  by ind i v idua l l y  adapt ing t o  a 
d e t e r r e n t  s t ra tegy .  T h e  s t ra tegy  i s  t o  r e s t r a i n  oriels ha rves t  a t  t he  
cooperative level unless and  u n t i l  an excessive to ta l  ha rves t  i s  detected. 
If  anyone defects, t he  bes t  r e p l y  t h a t  a l l  o f  t he  o the r  pa r t i c i pan ts  can 
make is t o  p u r s u e  noncooperative explo i ta t ion o f  t h e  f i she ry  fo r  all subse- 
q u e n t  t ime per iods.  T h e  d e t e r r e n t  t h r e a t  is  n o t  "tit f o r  ta t "  but "defect 
f o reve r  i f  anyone defects  once." T h i s  s t ra tegy  is adopted by each o f  t he  
ident ica l  ha rves te rs  and  satisf ies Selten' ( 1  975)  per fectness p r o p e r t y  as 
t h e  optimal response o f  a l l  possible h is tor ies o f  p lay.  
T h e  d e t e r r e n t  s t ra tegy  i s  what  makes the  p resen t  va lue o f  res t ra in t  
g rea te r  t han  t h e  p resen t  va lue o f  defection. The  recogni t ion t h a t  any  
defect ion w i l l  des t roy  fo reve r  the  common resource, keeps one from defect- 
ing, as long as f u t u r e  ha rves ts  a re  su f f i c i en t l y  weighted re la t ive to  the  
p resen t  harvests .  
The  Moni tor ing Condit ion. One condi t ion t h a t  keeps Lewis and  
Cowens's f i s h  ha rves te rs  from a s i tuat ion in which some reta l ia te  while 
o t h e r s  do  n o t  i s  t h e  presumpt ion o f  p e r f e c t  and  costless moni tor ing.  Each 
ha rves te r  moni tors  the  behavior  o f  a l l  o the rs  by moni tor ing the  to ta l  f i s h  
h a r v e s t  in each time per iod.  Such moni tor ing i s  presumed t o  b e  w i thou t  
costs, and  always correct .  
T h e  Cumulat ive Ef fect  o f  t he  Condit ions. Lewis and  Cowens's model 
p r e d i c t s  an indef in i te ly  extended cooperative arrangement, wh ich  i s  a r r i v e d  
a t  and  enforced by the  pa r t i c i pan ts  themselves. These condit ions--and 
t h e i r  conf igurat ion--are necessary condit ions. A l l  must b e  satisf ied to  
reach a n d  susta in  t h e  cooperat ive equi l ibr ium.  
Yet ,  each condi t ion i s  un l i ke l y  to  b e  obta ined in a na tu ra l  set t ing.  
Lewis and  Cowens acknowledge, fo r  instance, t ha t  t he  pe r fec t  and  costless 
moni tor ing assumption i s  too s t rong  t o  b e  satisf ied in pract ice.  I f  each o f  
t h e  condi t ions taken  separately i s  un l i ke l y  t o  b e  met by an actual commons 
dilemma, ce r ta in l y  the  odds of ever  observ ing the  confluence o f  a l l  o f  them 
must b e  deemed exceedingly small. 
The  quest ion then  is how to  t r e a t  these unreal is t ic  condi t ions and  the  
Lewis a n d  Cowens model in analyz ing t h e  prospects  for  t h e  resolut ion o f  a 
commons dilernma. A f requen t  stance taken by analysts  i s  t o  ignore a 
model ( o r  t o  c r i t i c i ze  i t )  because i t s  assumptions a re  unreal is t ic .  A n  
a l te rna t i ve  stance i s  t o  d i s rega rd  t h e  assumptions and  embrace t h e  model 
by presuming t h a t  t he  p red ic ted  outcome i s  t h e  most l i ke l y  outcome in 
actual set t ings.  Yet  a third perspect ive,  wh ich  we adopt ,  i s  t o  accept t he  
model as a polar  case showing the  condi t ions necessary to  an extreme so r t  
o f  outcome--a p u r e l y  p r i v a t e  resolut ion p r i v a t e l y  enforced w i thou t  i ns t i -  
tu t ions--and t h e n  t o  take t h e  condi t ions it ident i f ies  as variables. These 
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variables have to  take  on  extreme values to  produce the o r ig ina l  proof .  
These var iab les may e x h i b i t  a range  o f  states o r  values in actual set t ings.  
Let u s  now examine how these f i v e  condi t ions could be reexamined us ing  
an i ns t i t u t i ona l  framework. 
B lomqu is t  & Ostrom: I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Capac i t y  and the  R e s o l u t i o n  of  a Commons Dilemma 
Resolution W i t h  I ns t i t u t i ons  
The  In format ion Condit ion. I f  we re lax the  assumption t h a t  a l l  
par t ic ipants  w i t h  access t o  the  commons a l ready know e v e r y t h i n g  about  the  
resource and  i t s  users,  t hen  perhaps we should expect  t h a t  pa r t i c i pan ts  
wi l l  exp lo i t  t he  commons t o  an i n i t i a l  state o f  overuse before they become 
concerned w i t h  overuse. Detr imental e f fects  o f  overuse may b e  the  t r i g g e r  
for  i nd i v idua ls  who va lue the  commons to  beg in  t o  i n q u i r e  about  i t s  
capacity a n d  i t s  use by them and  others.  
T h e  fact  t h a t  use rs  do  n o t  know a l l  t hey  need to  know does n o t  mean 
they  a r e  doomed t o  a dynamic o f  dest ruct ion.  The avai lab i l i ty  o f  informa- 
t ion can b e  viewed as a process. In format ion ga the r ing  can b e  i n i t i a ted  
by t h e  pa r t i c i pan ts  themselves. Eefore they find answers, we should 
expect t hey  must  d iscover  the  re levant  questions. T h i s  may s t a r t  w i t h  
simple i nqu i r i es  such as: Why is the  whter corning ou t  o f  t he  well  sa l ty  
now? Or ,  w h y  a r e  we using more ne ts  and  catch ing fewer f i sh?  When 
such a po in t  i s  reached, t h e  process can go in d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
I f  each ind i v idua l  u s e r  must  under take  an invest igat ion o f  t he  commons 
to  d iscover  personal ly  a l l  re levant  information, t h e  prospects  may b e  dim 
indeed. If, on  t h e  o the r  hand,  a pa r t i c i pan t  o r  g r o u p  o f  pa r t i c i pan ts  can 
invoke  an  ex i s t i ng  i ns t i t u t i ona l  arrangement t o  a id  them in finding i n f o r -  
mation about  t h e i r  problem, b e t t e r  prospects  may arise. Fo r  pol icy analysts  
the quest ion t o  ask may n o t  be: Do a l l  pa r t i c i pan ts  know what  i s  go ing  on?  
Rather, one should as: I s  t he re  some way fo r  pa r t i c i pan ts  t o  find o u t  what  
i s  go ing  on?  Can pa r t i c i pan ts  engage some mechanism f o r  d iscovery about  
the causes o f  t h e i r  losses? Is  the re  a c o u r t  system, an  agency, o r  a 
foundation t h a t  m igh t  b e  able t o  i n fo rm the  use rs  o r  under take  an  inquiry? 
Are  cost -shar ing arrangements avai lable fo r  such e f f o r t s ?  
T h e  Communication Condit ion. I f  an  in format ion-gather ing process i s  
engaged by o r  o n  beha l f  o f  a subgroup  o f  users,  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  t rans late 
i n to  a resolut ion o f  a commons dilemma w i thou t  dissemination t o  o the r  
users. T h i s  makes t h e  ident i t icat ion o f  use rs  and  o f  t h e  boundar ies o f  t he  
resource c r i t i ca l  elements o f  information. In addi t ion,  a process o f  d is-  
semination o f  in format ion must  ex i s t  o r  b e  developed. 
T h e  second dimension o f  communication i s  d iscourse among use rs  about  
t h e i r  common problem and  possible j o in t  s t ra teg ies fo r  resolut ion.  If a 
solut ion i s  n o t  ex te rna l l y  imposed, and  i f  we cannot expect  each user  to  
adopt  t h e  same s t ra tegy  in isolat ion (as Lewis and  Cowens p o s i t ) ,  t h e  
choice a n d  maintenance o f  commons-sharing arrangement  requ i res  conmu- 
n icat ion among the  users.  
Such communication w i l l  ne i the r  b e  pe r fec t  n o r  costless. Not al l  users  
need be i nvo l ved  in the  development of proposals o r  ideas about  resolu- 
t ion. A self-selection process may even develop where those most immedi- 
a te ly  a f fected by overuse a r e  most l i ke l y  to  seek ou t  o r  create a forum fo r  
d iscuss ing possible resolut ions. A t r ade  association of f i s h  ha rves te rs  o r  
water producers,  l i t i ga t i on  among claimants to  a resource, o r  some o the r  
arrangement, may make possible o r  requ i re  in teract ion among users.  The 
po in t  is t ha t  i t may n o t  b e  necessary to  assume pe r fec t  and  costless com- 
munication t o  obta in  a resolut ion o f  a commons dilemma. I f  an  imperfect 
forum p rov ides  some shar ing o f  information and  some in teract ion among 
use rs  fo r  t he  a i r i n g  o f  possible resolut ions, prospects  w i l l  improve. The  
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grea te r  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  wh ich  such a capacity i s  used, t he  g rea te r  t h e  
l ikel ihood o f  resolut ion. 
T h e  Symmetry Condi t ion.  The  symmetry condi t ion raises t h e  quest ion 
of cost-sharing. Unless one i s  w i l l i ng  t o  assume to ta l  a pr iu r i  information, 
(pe r fec t  and  costless) communication, and  costless enforcement moni tor ing,  
any  resolut ion o f  t he  commons dilemma w i l l  i nvo l ve  costs, and  t h u s  the  
issue of cost allocation. The  pa r t i c i pan ts  in Lewis and  Cowens model bear  
the  costs o f  h a r v e s t  reduc t i on  and  deterrence symmetrical ly since they a re  
identical.  In a symmetrical si tuation, a "prominent"  solut ion (Schell ing, 
1963; also Hard in ,  1982, p. 90) ex i s t s  t o  t h e  allocation problem; everyone 
bears  l ln th  o f  t h e  costs. Symmetry o f  i n te res t  in t h e  use o f  t h e  commons 
makes agreeing o n  a cost -shar ing r u l e  a t r i v i a l  mat ter .  
When the  i n te res ts  o f  j o in t  use rs  a re  asymmetric, t h i s  al location decision 
is c r i t i ca l l y  impor tant .  Al location o f  costs must  relate to  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  i n te res ts  among t h e  pa r t i c i pan ts .  The  aggregat ion o f  benef i ts  t o  pa r -  
t i c i pan ts  from a pa r t i cu la r  cooperative scheme could exceed the  aggregat ion 
o f  costs; y e t  pa r t i c i pan ts  s t i l l  fa i l  t o  bea r  t h e  full costs because the  
allocution o f  costs t o  some exceeds t h e i r  benef i ts .  Hard in  (1982, p. 92) 
a rgues  t h a t  u n d e r  condi t ions o f  asymmetry n o  abs t rac t  a pr iur i  cost-shar- 
ing r u l e  can avoid con f l i c t s  when appl ied post  hoc t o  an asymmetrical 
g r o u p  whose numbers had  n o t  p rev ious l y  bo rne  such costs. A cost-sharing 
r u l e  must b e  developed a n d  adopted f o r  t he  pa r t i cu la r  case in question. 
Lack o f  symmetry o f  i n te res ts  i s  t o  b e  expected in actual set t ings.  We 
bel ieve it highly un l i ke l y  t h a t  each and  e v e r y  use r  o f  a j o in t  fac i l i ty  o the r  
than  a p u r e  Samuelsonian p u b l i c  good w i l l  d e r i v e  exact ly  t he  same bene f i t  
f rom i t s  use and  s u f f e r  exact ly  t h e  same loss f rom i t s  deter iorat ion.  If we 
a re  t o  have a theoret ica l  t reatment  o f  an  i t e ra ted  commons dilemma capable 
o f  p r e d i c t i n g  a n y t h i n g  o the r  than  absolute and  inev i tab le des t ruc t i on ,  we 
would have t o  acknowledge t h e  i ns t i t u t i ona l  capacity o f  use rs  t o  develop a 
cost -shar ing r u l e  su i ted t o  t h e i r  case as a var iab le c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  the  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  s i tuat ion and  t h e  prospects  f o r  resolut ion. 
T h e  Enforcement Condit ion. T h e  Lewis and  Cowens model impl ic i t ly  
makes a s t r u c t u r a l  change in the i n te ra ted  Prisoners' Dilemma game tha t  
has been l ikened t o  t h e  commons dilemma. T h r o u g h  t h e i r  combination o f  
condi t ions,  t hey  p roduce  a s i tuat ion where i t  i s  n o t  possible t o  defect  
whi le  a l l  o t h e r s  cooperate. Nor  would one cooperate while a l l  o the rs  
defect. Re fe r r i ng  back t o  t h e  o r ig ina l  game s t ruc tu re ,  t h i s  operates as an 
el imination o f  t he  "temptation" and  l lsucker'sl l  payof fs ,  leaving each p laye r  
w i t h  a choice on ly  o f  cooperating whi le  a l l  o the rs  cooperate ( t h e  second- 
best  p a y o f f )  o r  defect ing whi le  a l l  o the r  defect  ( t h e  th i rd -bes t  payo f f ) .  
Under  such a s t r u c t u r e ,  cooperating dominates defect ing.  Such a s i tuat ion 
y ie lds an  i nde f in i t e l y  extended equi l ibr ium.  
The  quest ion t h e n  arises, can such a s t r u c t u r a l  change b e  made by 
use rs?  T h e  answer depends upon  whether  use rs  a re  capable o f  making 
entorceable con t rac ts  t h a t  eliminate t h e  "temptation" and  llsuckerll payof fs .  
A ' 'cont ingent  cont ract"  accomplishes t h i s  and  the re fo re  can change a 
commons dilemma in to  a s i tuat ion where cooperating dominates defect ing.  
In the  con tex t  o f  an  ove rused  common resource, a cont ingent  cont ract  
m igh t  b e g i n  w i t h  a proposed cur ta i lment  o f  use by a l l  pa r t i es  t o  a p re -  
scr ibed level. Such a proposal  i s  submi t ted to  each pa r t i c i pan t  f o r  r a t i -  
f icat ion w i t h  a condi t ion t h a t  t h e  arrangement does n o t  become binding 
upon  t h a t  pa r t i c i pan t  unless a s tated p ropor t i on  o f  t h e  o the r  pa r t i c i pan ts  
also r a t i f y .  Par t ic ipants  can agree t o  such a cur ta i lment ,  while being 
protected f rom be ing  a I9sucker," since the re  i s  no obl igat ion to  cooperate 
unless enough o t h e r s  do t h e  same. 
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Once the   sufficient^ number o f  Par t ic ipants  have agreed to  cooperate, 
the agreement takes ef fect .  L i ke  a l l  cont racts ,  it can b e  enforced by any 
p a r t y  against  a n y  defector .  Enforcement does n o t  have t o  b e  p r i v a t e  
enforcement. T h e  avai lab i l i ty  o f  i ns t i t u t i ons  f o r  t h e  enforcement of 
contracts  subs t i t u tes  t h e  cost o f  u s i n g  such ins t i t u t i ons  fo r  t h e  cost o f  
p r i v a t e  enforcement and  lowers the  threshold of pa r t i c i pa t i on  in 
enforcement f rom a l l  use rs  t o  as few as one. A s  moni tor ing approaches a 
su f t i c i en t  degree o f  accuracy, t he  iitemptationli p a y o f f  may b e  e f fec t i ve l y  
eliminated, o r  a t  least reduced below the  payo f f  f rom cooperating while a l l  
o the rs  cooperate. I ns t i t u t i ona l  capacity fo r  t h e  making and  en fo rc ing  
contracts  ex i s t s  in many se t t i ngs  and  t h e  recogni t ion of i t s  avai lab i l i ty  may 
allow us t o  eliminate a number o f  problematic assumptions (e.g., ident ica l  
users,  complete in format ion)  necessary to  the  private-enforcement approach 
(see discussion by Hard in ,  1982; B rubaker ,  1975; & Guttman, 1978, o f  
Contingent con t rac t i ng ) .  
T h e  Moni tor ing Condit ion. We cannot expect  pe r fec t  and  costless 
moni tor ing in a n a t u r a l l y  o c c u r r i n g  set t ing.  The  quest ion i s  whether  
pa r t i c i pan ts  can s t r u c t u r e  a capacity t h a t  p rov ides  su f f i c i en t  moni tor ing t o  
deter  pa r t i c i pan ts  f rom defect ing and  t o  sanction those who do. Eve ry  
cr iminal  ac t  does n o t  have t o  r e s u l t  in convic t ion and  incarcerat ion fo r  law 
enforcement t o  w o r k  n o r  does eve ry  i nd i v idua l  who exceeds t h e  maximum 
allowable water  use need t o  b e  caught  t o  avoid t h e  deplet ion o f  t he  common 
resource. The  appointment o f  an outs ide monitor i s  also a feasible opt ion 
in meny ins t i t u t i ona l  set t ings.  A n  outs ide monitor displaces a considerable 
amount o f  t h e  responsib i l i ty  f o r  en fo rc ing  the  cooperative arrangement from 
the  pa r t i c i pan ts  and  can implement time-consuming means o f  moni tor ing t h a t  
might  n o t  b e  feasible i f  j o in t  use rs  o f  t he  commons were t h e  on ly  monitors. 
T h e  Condi t ions as Variables. We have approached Lewis and  Cowens's 
f ive condi t ions as a set o f  var iab les whose values may b e  af fected by t h e  
i ns t i t u t i ona l  mil ieu w i t h i n  wh ich  a commons s i tuat ion occurs. We have 
a rgued  t h a t  t h e  poss ib i l i t ies  fo r  cooperative commons-sharing arrangements 
are enhanced as t h e  values o f  these f i v e  var iab les approach a su f f i c i en t  
level o v e r  time t o  s h i f t  t he  s t r u c t u r e  o f  incent ives and  const ra in ts  faced 
by jo in t  use rs  o f  t h e  commons closer t o  those pos i ted by Lewis and  Cow- 
ens. B u t  in the  analysis o f  a long-term commons dilemma, it is n o t  neces- 
sa ry  t o  presume a l l  f i v e  condi t ions must  be met o r  t he  commons w i l l  b e  
dest royed.  T h e  v e r y  fact  t h a t  in most actual set t ings,  commons dilemmas 
a re  i t e ra ted  allows pa r t i c i pan ts  to  evolve a so lut ion t h r o u g h  a v a r i e t y  o f  
i ns t i t u t i ona l  arrangements. What condi t ions t h e  resolut ion o f  a commons 
dilemma i s  t h e  capacity t o  make such changes. 
T h e  genera l  i ns t i t u t i ona l  arrangements t h a t  enhance t h e  capabi l i ty  o f  
pa r t i c i pan ts  t o  reach a pa r t i cu la r  solut ion inc lude the i ns t i t u t i ona l  capacity 
to  develop: 
1. In format ion about  t h e  commons and  use-patterns; 
2. A forum f o r  communication among those affected; 
3.  Cost -shar ing formulae accepted by most par t ic ipants  as being 
4. Enforceable, cont ingent  contracts; and  
5. Ef fect ive moni tor ing of use-patterns. 
equitable; 
I nd i v idua ls  fac ing a commons dilemma s i tuat ion in an ins t i t u t i ona l  set t ing 
where they  can develop the  above ins t i t u t i ons  should b e  more l i ke l y  t o  
adopt  a cooperative conimons-sharing arrangement than  ind iv iduals  in an 
ins t i t u t i ona l  mil ieu w i thou t  such capabil i t ies. In the  case o f  t he  West Basin 
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g roundwate r  commons dilemma, a l l  o f  these capabil i t ies were developed and 
used in t h e  evolut ion o f  a p rog ram fo r  t he  cur ta i lment  o f  use o f  t he  basin. 
T h e  West Basin Case and  Ins t i t u t i ona l  Capacity 
In the  West Basin o f  Southern Cal i forn ia 's  Los Angeles Coun ty ,  j o in t  
users  of a commori resource have, ove r  a number o f  years,  formulated a 
so lut ion t o  t h e i r  i t e ra ted  commons dilemma. T h e i r  solut ion is ne i the r  
p u r e l y  p r i v a t e  n o r  an external ly- imposed, coercive solut ion. It invo lves 
the  development of capacities f o r  communication, cost -shar ing , and  moni- 
t o r i n g ,  and  t h e  use and  adaptation o f  capacities f o r  information prov is ion,  
con t rac t i ng  and  con t rac t  enforcement. I t  invo lves the  in teract ion o f  pr i -  
vate users,  p r i v a t e  i ns t i t u t i ons ,  and  pub l i c  i ns t i t u t i ons  in a complex set o f  
ar rangements t h a t  generate a new r u l e  con f igu ra t i on  gove rn ing  behavior  in 
t h e  j o in t  use o f  t h e  commons. 
In a semiarid reg ion such as the  Los Angeles metropoli tan area, econom- 
ic development depends on  the  avai lab i l i ty  o f  a dependable water supp ly .  
Ear ly  economic development in t h e  area was based almost exc lus ive ly  on  the  
use of g roundwate r .  The  "safe y ie lds"  o f  many o f  these basins were f i r s t  
exceeded in the  1930s. B y  the  ea r l y  1940s. o v e r d r a f t  condit ions were so 
severe in some basins t h a t  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t he  basins was threatened. None- 
theless, t he  water  ex t rac ted  f rom u n d e r g r o u n d  was more a t t r a c t i v e  in cost 
and  q u a l i t y  t han  a l te rna t i ve  sources. Water use rs  cont inued t o  wi thdraw 
water  arid did so a t  an  increas ing ra te  as t h e  area developed. West Basin, 
be ing adjacent t o  the  Pacific Ocean ana  lowest in the  series o f  basins, 
faced the  most severe problems of o v e r d r a f t  and  saltwater in t rus ion.  
A s  i nd i v idua ls  in the  bas in not iced water  levels fa l l ing and  word  spread 
o f  sa l twater  i n t rus ion ,  each pumper ' s  incent ive was to  cont inue t o  increase 
pumping.  Fai lure t o  do so would simply mean tha t  one's des i red water  
would b e  ex t rac ted  by another  use r .  Water levels steadi ly lowered, and  
saltwater i n t r u d e d  f u r t h e r  and  f u r t h e r  along the  coast. Unless the  pa r t i c -  
ipants ,  or  ex te rna l  au tho r i t i es ,  r e s t r u c t u r e d  the  s i tuat ion faced by the  
water p roducers ,  t h e y  would j o in t l y  des t roy  a resource o f  considerable 
economic value. 
Over  approx imate ly  a 20-year pe r iod ,  t he  water  p roducers  o f  West Basin 
created a successful water  management p rog ram (see Lipson, 1978, f o r  t he  
deta i ls  o f  t h i s  development). T h i s  p rog ram invo lved  developing va r ious  
p a r t s  o f  t he  commons-sharing arrangement arid then  fitting them together .  
The  s teps toward  the  resolut ion o f  t he  problem inc luded:  
1. The creation of a voluntary association of water producers to 
share information available from a state water resources 
division about the boundaries and conditions of the south 
coastal plain basins,  to provide a forum for discussion of the 
information and of possible alternatives to the present situa- 
tion, and to relate activities occurring in different public 
arenas. The association was supported by voluntary dues 
from producers based on the amount of water each produced 
from the basin, with votes apportioned accordingly. 
2 .  The use of the available court system for three principal 
purposes. First ,  through discovery and reference proce- 
dures ,  to ascertain reliable information on basin supply and 
use pa t te rns ,  and to determine the identify of all other users  
in the basin. Second, to adjudicate rights based on use- 
patterns and the determined safe yield of the basin, which 
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r i g h t s  were then secure  unto  t h e  par t ies  and  could b e  worked 
into an agreement curtailing total use  to t h e  safe yield level. 
T h r e e ,  to  give force a n d  effect to  tha t  agreement a s  an 
enforceable  settlement provided tha t  i t  was s igned  b y  a t  least  
80 percent  of u s e r s .  The  cost of t h e  litigation was appor-  
tioned among t h e  u s e r s  based on the i r  r i g h t s  a s  determined in  
t h e  agreement .  
3 .  T h e  establishment of a n  office of t h e  s t a t e  water  resources  
agency a s  Watermaster to  s e r v e  a s  a permanent  monitor of u s e  
in  t h e  bas in  and  compliance with t h e  agreement .  Two-thirds 
of t h e  cos ts  of t h e  Watermaster service a r e  assessed on these 
p r o d u c e r s  with r i g h t s  to  water  and one-third is  borne  b y  the 
State  of California. 
4 .  T h e  creat ion of a publ ic  water  dis t r ic t  covering t h e  basin 
a rea  to provide  a n  al ternat ive source of supply-- i .e . ,  t o  
import sufficient f r e s h  water  into the area  t o  make u p  t h e  
difference between groundwater  extract ions a n d  total water  
use .  Costs  of t h e  water  d i s t r ic t ' s  operation a n d  acquisition 
a r e  borne  b y  water  u s e r s  according to amount of u s e  with 
minor reliance on t h e  proper ty  tax .  
The  par t ic ipants  in t h e  West Basin com1nons dilemma developed t h e  
institutional capacities necessary to  their  commons-sharing arrangement  
through the i r  adaptation of existing capacities and  the i r  creation of new 
ones.  The  information condition, for instance,  of each par t ic ipant  having 
complete information about  t h e  resource and  use pa t te rns  was approximated 
by t h e  adaptation of t h e  data-collection pract ices  of a s ta te  agency and t h e  
discovery and  reference procedures  of t h e  cour t .  The  provision of infor- 
mation about  individual u s e r s  and  t h e  losses they were incurr ing and  the i r  
willingness to  explore  a l te rna t ives  occurred t h r o u g h  t h e  creation of t h e  
voluntary association. 
The  communication condition was approximated in a similar way. The  
creation of t h e  association provided a forum for information dissemination 
and  for  t h e  exploration of a l ternat ives  without t h e  commitment by various 
association members. The  use  of litigation allowed dissemination of infor- 
mation and  communication among u s e r s  and  eventual  cont ingent  commitment. 
Cost-sharing a r rangements  were developed for each s tep  in t h e  resolu- 
tion process .  The  use  of proportionate cost-sharing began with t h e  volun- 
t a r y  association. Dues were assessed based on t h e  amount of groundwater  
ex t rac ted .  In t h e  cour t  case ,  cos ts  of investigation and  litigation were 
matched to  t h e  benefit obtained in t h e  judgement--i.e., t h e  prescr ibed 
r igh ts  to water .  The  cost  of monitoring compliance with t h e  u p p e r  bounds 
of one ' s  r igh ts  was again matched to r i g h t s ,  with a portion borne by t h e  
S ta te  of California. Citizens o f  t h e  s t a t e  have a n  in te res t  t h a t  accura te  
information be  ga thered  on groundwater  conditions and  t h a t  facilities be  
maintained t h a t  encourage solutions to  comnlons dilemmas. T h e  cost  of 
providing a n  al ternat ive source of supply was apportioned primarily to 
water  use ,  r a t h e r  than  to production. 
T h e  u s e  of cont ingent  contract ing to  formulate a n  enforceable com- 
mons-sharing arrangement  was explicit in t h e  West Basin case. The plan 
for curtailment which emerged in t h e  course of litigation was not effective 
unless  80 percent  of t h e  par t ies  s igned.  The  plan allowed those who did 
sign to  move toward a cooperative resolution without being committed to  a 
cooperative s t r a t e g y  t h a t  could resu l t  in a s u c k e r ' s  payoff. When 80 
percent  did s i g n ,  a n  interim agreement enforceable against  s ignator ies  took 
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ef fect .  A f t e r  exper ience w i t h  the  i n te r im  agreement, t he  f ina l  c o u r t  
judgement made it enforceable against  a / /  par t ies.  
T h e  capacity f o r  e f fec t i ve  moni tor ing o f  use pa t te rns  was developed o u t  
o f  t he  data col lect ion func t i on  per formed by the  state's water resources 
d i v i s ion  as fac t - f i nd ing  referee in t h e  l i t igat ion o f  t he  West Basin case. 
Hav ing  formed a h i s t o r y  o f  g roundwate r  p roduc t i on  in t h e  bas in,  and  
hav ing  pa r t i c i pa ted  in t h e  ident i f icat ion o f  a l l  water  p roducers  in the  
bas in,  t he  agency was s ign i f icant ly  b e t t e r  posit ioned to  pe r fo rm an ongoing 
moni tor ing o f  i nd i v idua ls '  ex t rac t i ons  than  the  i nd i v idua ls  were to  pe r fo rm 
tha t  f unc t i on  w i t h  respect  t o  one another .  So the  agency was, in essence, 
' lh i red"  as Watermaster t o  b e  paid by t h e  pa r t i es  and  t h e  state to  monitor 
compliance w i t h  the  cur ta i lment  agreement (see Cali fornia, State o f ,  annual  
r e p o r t s  fo r  a deta i led ident i f icat ion o f  exact ly  how much i s  pumped by each 
p roducer  each y e a r ) .  
B y  t h e  close o f  t h e  process o f  development o f  t h e  commons-sharing 
arrangement ,  West Basin water  p roducers  had  put in place and  used a l l  o f  
t he  elements o f  i ns t i t u t i ona l  capacity discussed above--information, commu- 
n icat ion,  cost -shar ing , cont ingent  con t rac t i ng ,  and moni tor ing.  T h r o u g h  
these measures, pa r t i c i pan ts  had  fundamental ly changed the  ru les  s t r u c t u r -  
ing t h e i r  s i tuat ion in such a way t h a t  a cooperative response was more 
rat ional  t han  a noncooperative response. 
The  developmerit o f  a resolut ion o f  t he  commons dilemma i s  p a r t  o f  t he  
West Basin s to ry .  From t h e  s tandpoint  o f  theoretical w o r k  and  t h e  analy- 
sis o f  commons dilemma s i tuat ions,  it is t he  most impor tant  p a r t .  B u t  f o r  
t h e  appl icat ion o f  analy t ica l  wGrk to  actual set t ings,  an  equal ly  impor tant  
ques t i on  is whethe r  t h e  commons-sharing arrangement  l 'worked ,I' in the  
sense o f  p roduc ing  the  in tended resul ts .  
Considerable data ex i s t  on the  h is tor ica l  use-pat terns in West Basin and  
on the  water  q u a n t i t y  and  qua l i t y  condi t ions o f  t he  Basin. These data 
ex tend  f rom approx imate ly  2 5  years  before the  i n i t i a t i on  o f  t he  basin- 
management programs t o  30 yea rs  the rea f te r .  We have examined t h i s  data 
series u s i n g  least-squares regress ion techniques and  ARIMA time-series 
arialysis (B lomquis t  & Ostrom, for thcoming) .  T h e  resu l t s  o f  t h i s  test ing 
ind icate tha t  aggregate ex t rac t i ons  f rom the Basin have been cu r ta i l ed  to  
t h e  safe y i e l d  o f  t he  bas in and  saltwater i n t r u s i o n  has n o t  f u r t h e r  un- 
dermined bas in water  qua l i t y .  Confidence levels a r e  su f f i c i en t l y  s t rong  t o  
suppor t  t he  conclusion t h a t  t he  basin-management programs developed for  
West Basin have indeed p roduced  t h e i r  in tended resul ts .  
NOTES 
' T h u s ,  a commons i s  n o t  a p u r e  p r i v a t e  good, as it i s  capable o f  use 
by more than  one use r  a t  a time, and  it i s  n o t  a p u r e  pub l i c  gooa in the  
Saniuelsonian sense o f  nonsub t rac tab i l i t y  , as a commons i s  a f i n i t e  resource 
o r  fac i l i ty  t h a t  i s  susceptible to  problems o f  c rowd ing  o r  overuse (see, f o r  
example, Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977). Nonetheless, t he  behavior  o f  pa r t i c i -  
pants  sha r ing  a commons may b e  r a t h e r  similar t o  the  behavior  o f  members 
o f  a g r o u p  at tempt ing to  p r o v i d e  themselves w i t h  a pub l i c  good. 
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